The Battle for Fox Hill Research Paper Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2500 words

The Battle for Fox Hill - Research Paper Example The division was under the operational command of X Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Edward M Almond, USA. The 7th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), commanded by Col. Homer L. Litzenberg, had been ordered to move to Hamhung and relieve the 26th Republic of Korea (ROK) Regiment engaged with Chinese Communists in the north. While marching on the road towards the Changjin Reservoir, also referred by its Japanese name as Chosin Reservoir, the Korean regiment had encountered fierce resistance near Sudong on October 28. Meanwhile, the Chinese forces had also checked the advance of Gen. Walton H. Walker’s Eighth Army south of the border, pushing them back to the Chongchon River. However, United Nations forces had no credible information on the numbers of Chinese troops accumulated across Yalu River on the Manchurian border by that time (Appleman, 1-5; Santelli, 35-36; Simmons, 1-12). Interrogation of 16 Chinese prisoners revealed that 42nd CCF (Chinese Communist Forces) Army had deployed its 124th, 125th and 126th Divisions to check the advance of the 1st Marine Division. On the morning of November 02, the 7th RCT relieved the 26th ROK Regiment without encountering any significant resistance. The 1st (Lt. Col. Raymond C. Davis) and 2nd (Lt. Col. Randolph S. D. Lockwood) Battalions, 7th Marines, were leading the advance, while 3rd Battalion (Maj. Maurice E. Roach) was positioned in the rear. Over the next five days, the 7th RCT fought against determined resistance from the Chinese 124th Division, pushing it north over the Funchilin Pass to Hagaru-ri. On November 13, the RCT received orders to capture Hagaru-ri and advance 40 miles north to the southern tip of Chosin Reservoir. The RCT had reached its objective by November 15. However, Smith was quite concerned over the long narrow stretch of his division against uncertain enemy size and determination. He had expr essed his concerns in a personal letter to Cmdt. Marine Corps, Gen. Clifton B. Cates, stating, â€Å"I do not like the prospect of stringing out a Marine division along a single mountain road for 120 miles from Hamhung to the Manchurian border†¦I have little confidence in the tactical judgment of X Corps or the realism of their planning†. (Simmons, 13-35; BH, 36; Bevilacqua). On November 19-20. the Eighth Army captured the North Korean capital, Pyongyang. The 7th RCT had reached Yudam-ni by November 25. As the elements of 7the Infantry Division arrived at the eastern side of the Chosin Reservoir on November 25, the 5th RCT (Lt. Col. Raymond L. Murray) had began movement to Yudam-ni. According to the plans, the 5th RCT was to pass through the lines of 7th RCT and lead the attack to Mupyong-ni west of the reservoir on the next day. On November 26, three captured enemy soldiers had revealed the presence of 58th, 59th, and 60th CCF Divisions of 20th CCF Army around Yudam-ni. On the night of November 25, a massive attack by Chinese in the west had destroyed three ROK divisions on the Eighth Army’s right flank, repulsing its advance. Now, the Chinese prime objective was destruction of the 1st Marine Division in the east. (Bevilacqua; Appleman, 7-8; Simmons, 40-47). The American high command was under the impression that China will never enter the war, and the resistance was merely a small force of Chinese volunteers. On November 27, the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines (Lt. Col. Harold S. Roise), launched the attack in the morning. The 7th Marines launched a secondary attack to the southwest. A temporary fall back of Chinese allowed the intermixed lead elements of the 5th and 7th Marines to make a 1 mile advance. Both regiments might have been combined under command of Assistant Division Commander, Brig. Gen. Craig, but he had departed for United States on emergency leave. Litzenberg had command authority as the senior officer.